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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPHINE H. CHRISTENSEN,
as guardian ad litem for and in behalf
of JOSEPH CHRISTENSEN, aka
JOSEPH
NORMAN
CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent~

Case No.
9694

vs.

FINANCIAL SERVICE CO., INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing

Defendant and Appellant seeks rehearing and
reconsideration of this Court's holding in its decision
filed January 25, 1963, that the plaintiff and respondent,
Joseph Christensen, the payee of the note in suit is a
holder in due course. If the Court on reconsideration
and rehearing determines that said plaintiff is not a
holder in due course, the defendant and respondent
seeks the Court's determination on the merits, (I)
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

whether the evidence supports the trial Court's findings
that there was sufficient and lawful consideration as
between the defendant and Norman Christensen who
induced the note, ( 2) a determination that the defendant
is entitled to any setoffs it may have proved as against
Norman Christensen, and ( 3) a determination that such
setoffs andjor failure of consideration exceed the
amount of the plaintiff's claim and that the defendant
is, therefore, entitled to judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the Statement of ~""'acts contained in
the defendant's original brief herein, or more properly
by way of clarification of that statement of facts, the
following:
The plaintiff Joseph Christensen did not give value
either to the defendant Financial Service Company,
Inc., or his father, Norman Christensen, and is a mere
donee of the note in suit.

ARGUl\tlENT
POINT I
THIS
COURT'S
DECISION
FILED
HEREIN ON JANUARY 25, 1963, IS IN
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
AND
RESPONDENT,
JOSEPH

2
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CliRISTENSEN IS A
COURSE.

HOLDER IN DUE

A. THE RECORD BELOW CLEARLY
INDICATES THAT JOSEPH CHRISTENSEN, THE PAYEE OF THE NOTE IN
SUIT, DID NOT GIVE VALUE TO ANYONE FOR THE NOTE BUT IS A MERE
DONEE.
The Court has stated in its opinion on page 3:
"Defendants avermant that Joseph did not
give value for the note appears to result from a
misapprehension. Its evidence was calculated to
show that he did not give value to the defendant
corporation. It is not essential that he did so. But
no evidence was adduced to show that Joseph did
not give value to his father, Norman Christensen.''
At the outset of the trial, the plaintiff, consistent
with his complaint, proceeded merely to produce the
note in suit and the proper signatures of the defendant's
officers, thus relying on the statutory presumption of
consideration. As the Court correctly indicates, the
defendant then proceeded with evidence showing that
the defendant received nothing of value from the plaintiff, Joseph Christensen, in exchange for the note.
( TR. 5.) Thereupon, the plaintiff proceeded to produce
evidence tending to show that the consideration for the
issuance of the note in suit was the cancellation of
alleged antecedent indebtedness of the defendant to
Norman Christensen. ( TR. 6.) After some discussion
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and testimony introduced by both sides, the plaintiff
objected to any further questions by the defendant with
regard to the defendant's relationship toN orman Christensen in connection with the alleged debt. At page 28
of the Transcript the following appears:
"MR. BROADBENT: You are alleging that
the consideration for this alleged note came from
Mr. Christensen [N ormanL
"MR. PRESTON: That's right."
Following an adjournment of the trial of the case
on August 25, 1961, and before the testimony was completed, the plaintiff submitted a brief to the court and
mailed a copy to the defendant's attorney on the 5th
day of September, 1961. On the first page of said brief
which is a part of the record herein, the plaintiff states:
"The plaintiff brings this action as the holder
of a promissory note in his favor for which he
gave no consideration for (sic) personally . . ."
After the case was concluded the defendant submitted its brief (PL. 49 et seq.). Defendant's brief
. stated on pages 2 and 3:
"The further uncontroverted evidence of the
defendant., and the express admission on page one
of the plaintiff"s brief herein_, established beyond
question that the plaintiff, Joseph Christensen,
the alleged payee of the note, neither took
delivery from any of defendant's authorized
agents nor himself gave consideration.-'-' (Emphasis supplied.)
This language was quoted and referred to subse4
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quently in the plaintiff's reply brief. It was challenged
only with regard to the question of delivery, as follows:
"It is impossible to claim lack of delivery, unless they clai1n that either Joseph or his father
stole the note. Thus, they had to have the note in
their hands in order to sign the same; so that the
first quotation is merely a misstatement of the
facts and of the contents of our previous brief."
This reply brief of the plaintiff, part of the record
herein, and before the trial court, further states at
page 2:
"Mr. and Mrs. Christensen have been divorced
with the tie between them being their only child,
Joseph. One of the most natural instincts in
human kind as well as in wild animals is the protection of offspring. The completion of an education of Joseph so that he might be self-supporting
in an honorable manner was the urge that gave
rise to the note s1ted upon . . ;H (Emphasis
added.)
The trial court's finding that the plaintiff is a holder
in due course was not based upon a finding of the fact,
or the lack of evidence to the contrary, that Joseph gave
value to his father or anyone else. At page 432 of the
Transcript, the court states:
"In the case of Joseph Christensen vs. Financial Service Company, the court finds as a fact
that there was at least sorne consideration which
ostensibly passed from Norman Christensen to
the Financial Service Company. I'm not finding
full consideration; just some. And to that extent
I find that Joseph is entitled to be clothed with

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

some of the robes of a holder and I direct judgment in his favor against Financial Service Co."
(Emphasis added.)

This view of the evidence is also reflected in the
Court's formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Finding of Fact No. 7 (PL Ill) as follows:
"That the note was given by the defendant to
the plaintiff in return for cancellation of indebtedness owed by the defendant corporation to one
Norman Christensen, the father of the defendant .... "
Finally, at page 3 of the plaintiff's and respondent's brief before this Court it is again expressly
admitted that:
"The record in this case shows that respondent
did not, from his own pocket give any consideration for the note."
In view of all of the foregoing, it is submitted that
the record is abundantly clear that Joseph Christensen
was a mere donee of the note in suit. To hold otherwise
is to vitiate the entire theory on which the case was tried
by both of the parties and to require further evidence
of facts not in issue between the parties. The presumption indulged by this Court that a payee is presumed to
be a holder in due course is at best questionable under
the law, as will appear hereafter. If such a presumption
exists in the law, it has been dissipated in this case by
evidence and the express oral and written statements
by plaintiff's counsel before the trial court.

6
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B. THE COUR,T IS IN ERROR
HOLDING THAT THE PAYEE HERE
PRESUMED TO BE OR IS A HOLDER
DUE COURS~~ IN THE ABSENCE
PROOF THAT HE GAVE VALUE.

IN
IS
IN
OF

It is conceded that there is a division in the authorities as to whether a payee can ever be a holder in due
course. It is conceded also that better view is probably
that a payee may be a holder in due course if he otherwise qualifies. Defendant's initial brief herein and the
authorities cited are not for the purpose of urging upon
this Court a contrary view. However, it does not follow
from the proposition that a payee may be a holder in
due course that he is presumed to be such. 36 Yale L. J.
608, Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course," relied
upon by the Court argues expressly to the contrary.
After a careful section by section analysis of the negotiable instruments act and the cases under the act and
under the common law preceding it, Professor Aigler
at pages 630-631 concludes:
"Since by the statute payees are holders, and
holders are presumptively holders in due course,
is it to be said that every payee is prima facie a
holder in due course? It is conceivable that such
should be the result. But, reading the statute in
the light of the common law and remembering
that in a large percentage of transactions the
instrument in its inception comes to the payee as
a promisee and not as a purchaser, would it not
more reasonably be concluded that a payee is not
entitled to the presumption unless it appears that
he took by purchase?n
7
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"After all, whether a payee is a holder in due
course is a question not susceptible of a categorical answer. In each instance the conclusion should
depend upon the type of situation presented.
No doubt~ prima facie~ a payee is not a holder in
due course because presumptively he took the
instrument as promisee rather than purchaser.
But, it always should be open to proof that he
really acquired the paper in the latter capacity,
in which event his status may be that of a due
course holder." (Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that even where the maker of an
instrument fails to show by affirmative evidence that
the payee did not give value to some other person, the
payee is not automatically a holder in due course. In
Seaboard Finance Co. v. Miles~ Sons~ Inc.~ 102 C.A.2d
526,277 P.2d 892 (1951), the defendant drew and made
a check for the convenience of its subcontractor, Davies,
which check was made payable to the plaintiff. The
court held that the presumtion of consideration was sufficiently rebutted by evidence that the drawer was not
indebted to the payee~ nor obligated to the subcontractor
to make the payments directly for his convenience and
had not guaranteed the subcontractors obligation to the
plaintiff. The court said 227'P2d, at 893.
" ... and plaintiff, knowing nothing of anything which transpired between defendant and
Davies [subcontractor] had no reason to expect
that defendant would make payments due it
from Davies. It is not contended that defendant
owed anything to plaintiff, nor ~was it shown that
plaintiff suffered any loss or detrirnent by reason
of the stoppage of payment on the check.n (Emphasis supplied.)
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In other words, the plaintiff-payee was held not to
be a holder in due course since there was no evidence
that it had given value in the form of some loss or detriment. And all the defendant was required to do was to
rebut the presumption of consideration between the
maker and payee.
Another case in which the plaintiff was the payee of
a note induced by a third party is Atkinson vs. Inglewood State Bank~ 141 Colo. 436, 348 Pac.2d. 702
(1960). That case holds by implication that the amount
of evidence necessary to rebut the alleged presumption
that the holder of a note is a holder in due course is that
amount of evidence which would raise a jury question.
The court stated: 348 Pac.2d at 705:
"We conclude that there was sufficient evidence of fraud as an inducement to the execution
of the instrument here so that the question
whether plaintiff was a holder in due course was
at issue. Defendant having proved at least a
prima facie defense, the burden was on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it was a holder in due course.

"
"We agree with the defendant's contention
that the value requirement of Sec. 52 (3) was not
satisfied. It is undisputed that following receipt
of the note from Palmer [who induced its execution], plaintiff credited his account in the amount
of $823.80. There is not the least suggestion~
however~ that Palmer was allowed to draw checks
against the credit thus extended.~~ (Emphasis
added.)
9
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Thus, where the maker established merely a prima
facie defense as against the person inducing the instrument~ the payee was put upon his proof to demonstrate
that he fulfilled all of the requirements of a holder in due
course. It is submitted in the instant case that the defendant produced a prima facie defense to the note in question not only with regard to absence of consideration
but also at least partial illegality of consideration as
well as fraud. That the trial court found no fr"aud is not
to say that such would not have been a jury question
or that there was not a prima facie defense, shifting the
burden to the one claiming to be a holder in due course.
The issue of illegality of the purported consideration between Norman Christensen and the defendant
was certainly raised before the trial court and was urged
upon this Court in defendant's original brief. Specifically, the defendant has contended that part of the
alleged consideration for the note in suite is a claim for
the payment of illegal dividends, ( 1) not out of surplus, ( 2) while the defendant corporation was insolvent,
( 3) not formally authorized, and, ( 4) on fictitious corporate indebtedness contrary to the Utah Constitution.
This vital issue has been passed over by both the trial
court and this honorable Court.

CONCLUSION
In one of the opening paragraphs of his article,
"Payees as Holders in Due Course," supra, Professor
Aigler observes, "Only infrequently have Courts given

10
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any attention to the background of the problem; they
have been disposed to seize upon certain language in the
Act, some of it pointing to one conclusion and some in
the opposite, or to be content with the adoption of one
of the two views expressed in two or three conspicuous
cases decided under the Statute.... "
It is respectfully contended that it has been expressly and impliedly admitted throughout the record
that the plaintiff in this case did not himself give value
for the note in suit to anyone. However, even if such is
not the case, the Negotiable Instruments Act does not
raise a presumption that a payee is a holder in due
course. It merely permits him to demonstrate that he is.
It is respectfully suggested that the Court's decision contains within it hasty extensions of that doctrine,
which confuse rather than clarify the law. The Court has
before it the opportunity upon reconsideration and rehearing of this matter to reconcile some of the confusion
that has heretofore existed.
To deny the respondent the gift contemplated by his
father is not to deny him the right properly to present
his father's claim against the appellant. A donee is not
a holder in due course. Tilley v. Price (Okla. 1954), 267
P.2d 996.
Respectfully submitted,
LORIN J. BROADBENT
1101 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.
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